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•    •  2Executive Summery 
 
Life expectancy in Europe and North-America has more than doubled in the 
past 200 years—from thirty to thirty-five years at birth in 1800 to seventy-eight 
years at birth in 2000. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the rise 
in life expectancy has been accompanied by a downward trend in fertility. This 
parallel decrease in mortality and fertility rates is known to economists as the 
“demographic transition.” The demographic transition has coincided with 
phenomenal technological progress that is continuing and even accelerating. 
This great wave of a technological progress is reflected in remarkable growth 
of per capita product (and all other possible measures of material wealth). 
These demographic and economic trends, however, are uneven in terms of their 
causes and measures over time. 
In the past twenty years, many economic models in the “Modern Growth” 
literature have offered an analytical framework with which to explain and 
simulate demographic transition in view of technological progress. A common 
feature of these models links the decrease in fertility and mortality to 
technological progress in the following sense: the basic assumption is that 
parents care about (derive utility from) the number of their children who 
survive to adulthood and their quality, usually defined in terms of human 
capital as measured by potential income. As mortality rates decline, it becomes 
increasingly worthwhile for parents to invest in each child’s human capital and 
to have fewer children. This linkage among mortality, fertility, and human-
capital accumulation may be classified as a version of the well known 
quantity–quality tradeoff in fertility decisions, formulated back in the 1960s, 
and implemented widely since than. 
The focus on infant and child mortality seems to have been relevant only 
until the middle of twentieth century, as by then, they already declined to very 
low levels. During the 19
th century it was improved nutrition that lowered 
infant's mortality rates, achieved by the rising productivity and income along 
with the economies industrialization. At the first half of the 20
th century 
•    •  3mortality rates were cut thanks to the discovery of effective preventive and 
curing treatments (sanitation, vaccines etc.) to most of the deadly infective 
diseases (such as Malaria, Polio, Dysentery, Typhus, etc.). These reductions in 
mortality rates were mainly in those of infants' and young children's, who are 
more vulnerable to malnutrition and infections.   
 In the second half of the twentieth century, however, life expectancy was 
extended by another ten years—this time due to significant progress in medical 
technology as a direct derivative of overall technological development. This 
revolutionary progress in medical technology offered new methods of 
diagnosis—MRI, CT, etc.—as well as curative techniques such as heart 
surgeries, endoscopies operations,  and organ transplants, not to mention a vast 
number of pharmaceutical innovations. Technological progress in healthcare, 
as in other sectors, has been driven by growing investment in R&D, and to 
implement these high-tech novelties, a well-schooled and-trained labor force is 
needed. Hence, the utilization of medical technologies and healthcare services 
becomes significantly expensive, so the services became available mainly 
through the health-insurance market – public and / or private - that developed 
around the middle of the twentieth century.  
Since the middle of the twentieth century, all industrialized economies 
have experienced a steady and significant increase in the share of national 
healthcare expenditure in national product. For example, the share of healthcare 
expenditure in American GNP rose monotonically from 5% in 1950 to 15% in 
2000. The rise in healthcare expenditure has been at the center of the public 
political and academic debate. Healthcare expenditure is not distributed equally 
among age groups: the older the cohort, the larger its share in expenditure 
relative to its share in the population. Most countries subsidize, to some extent, 
the use of healthcare services by the elderly, most of whom are retirees. The 
concurrence of rising longevity and falling fertility is aggravating the burden of 
this intergenerational support, especially in the countries that have Pay As You 
Go healthcare systems.  
•    •  4The present study offer a theoretical macroeconomic model  for this most 
recent phase of demographic and economic developments that have 
characterized modern industrialized countries in the past five decades, stressing 
the effects of advancing medical technology in these dynamics. The model is 
ought to use as a comprehensive framework for the analysis of health tax 
policies in the context of economic growth and demographic dynamics. In the 
model, Endogenous accumulation of human capital increases labor 
productivity and promotes technological progress in the medical industry. 
Technological progress lowers the relative price of health services. It is shown 
that the rising income and decreasing price of health services allow the elderly 
to prolong their life expectancy by using increasing amounts of healthcare 
services—but not necessarily by consuming a larger share of healthcare 
expenditure. As adults invest more in their human capital, they bear fewer 
children. Thus, the aging of the population is two-tailed. We characterize the 
optimal heath tax rate, and analyze the affects of suboptimal taxation on the 
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Endogenous accumulation of human capital increases labor productivity and 
promotes technological progress in the medical industry. Technological 
progress lowers the relative price of health services. The rising income and 
decreasing price of health services allow the elderly to prolong their life 
expectancy by using increasing amounts of healthcare services—but not 
necessarily by consuming a larger share of healthcare expenditure. As adults 
invest more in their human capital, they bear fewer children. Thus, the aging 
of the population is two-tailed. We characterize the optimal heath tax rate, and 




Life expectancy in Europe and North-America has more than doubled in the past 200 
years—from thirty to thirty-five years at birth in 1800 to seventy-eight years at birth 
in 2000. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the rise in life expectancy has 
been accompanied by a downward trend in fertility, from 4.8 average births per 
woman in 1870 to 1.4 in 1995 (Livi-Bacci, 2000). This parallel decrease in mortality 
and fertility rates is known to economists as the “demographic transition.” The 
demographic transition has coincided with phenomenal technological progress that is 
continuing and even accelerating (Mokyr, 1990). This great wave of technological 
progress is reflected in remarkable growth of per capita product (and all other possible 
measures of material wealth). These demographic and economic trends, however, are 
uneven in terms of their causes and measures over time. 
 
•    •  6The first ten-year gain in life expectancy was achieved during the nineteenth 
century. The fruits of the Industrial Revolution—a significant increase in per-capita 
income and consumption—led to a great improvement in nutrition (and other basic 
elements of standard of living, such as clothing), which in turn improved (physical) 
labor productivity (Fogel, 1993). The improvement in health, occasioned by the much 
better nutrition that resulted in lower mortality rates—especially for infants and 
children, who are more vulnerable to malnutrition—had nothing to do with medical 
science (Mokyr, 1993).  
The next twenty-year gain in life expectancy was achieved in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Around the beginning of that century, preventive medicines for 
most bacterial diseases (malaria, cholera, typhus, etc.) were found. In the decades that 
followed, “classic” forms of public healthcare—vaccines and antibiotics, disinfection 
of water, hygienic education, etc.—were developed and implemented. The near-
eradication of main infectious diseases marked a great contribution by medical 
science and technology to mortality reduction, especially (again) for infants, whose 
immune systems are more vulnerable. Furthermore, these preventive medicines did 
not incur a significant cost at the household and public level. This, however, would 
change in the following fifty years.  
In the second half of the twentieth century, life expectancy was extended by 
another ten years—this time due to significant progress in medical technology as a 
direct derivative of overall technological development, mainly via computer-related 
innovations. This revolutionary progress in medical technology offered new methods 
of diagnosis—MRI, CT, etc.—as well as curative techniques such as heart surgeries 
and organ transplants, not to mention a vast number of pharmaceutical innovations. 
These technological breakthroughs and improvements powered much of the life-
expectancy extension, which originated mainly in the reduction of mortality rates 
among adults and the elderly (Cutler and Meara, 2001). To implement these high-tech 
novelties, a well-schooled and-trained labor force is needed.  
Technological progress in healthcare, as in other sectors, has been driven mainly 
by growing private investment in R&D. As a property right, once technologies 
become more widely implemented and their use requires more advanced professional 
training, the utilization of medical technologies and healthcare services becomes 
•    •  7significantly expensive in terms of direct monetary cost
1 (Newhouse, 1992). As the 
growing cost to user of healthcare services subjected use to severe uncertainty, the 
services became available mainly through the health-insurance market that developed 
around the middle of the twentieth century (Weisbrod, 1991). 
Currently, health-insurance services may be provided as public insurance services 
that are funded on a “Pay As You Go” (PAYG) basis, e.g., in Canada for instance; in 
private insurance markets as is common in the U.S.; or in some mixture of the two. 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, all industrialized economies have 
experienced a steady and significant increase in the share of national healthcare 
expenditure in national product. For example, the share of healthcare expenditure in 
American GNP rose monotonically from 5% in 1950 to 15% in 2000. The rise in 
healthcare expenditure has been at the center of the public political and academic 
debate. Healthcare expenditure is not distributed equally among age groups: the older 
the cohort, the larger its share in expenditure relative to its share in the population. 
Most countries subsidize, to some extent, the use of healthcare services by the elderly, 
most of whom are retirees. The concurrence of rising longevity and falling fertility is 
aggravating the burden of this intergenerational support, especially in the countries 
that have PAYG healthcare systems.  
The present study focuses on this most recent phase of demographic and 
economic developments that have characterized modern industrialized countries in the 
past five decades, stressing the effects of advancing medical technology in these 
dynamics.   
 
Let us place the present study in the context of the literature that deals already 
with the different phases and aspects of the demographic transition.  
                                                           
1 Although much of the new medical knowledge and many of its techniques are implemented 
at the household production level—healthier diet, abstinence from tobacco, and other healthy 
lifestyle attributes—the significant direct cost of health improvements and lifespan 
prolongation comes from the consumption of healthcare services—medical care, drugs etc.—
that are technology-intensive. 
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    2.1  Infant/Child Mortality, Fertility Choice, and Growth 
In the past twenty years, many economic models in the “Modern Growth” literature 
have offered an analytical framework with which to explain and simulate 
demographic transition in view of technological progress. A common feature of these 
models links the decrease in fertility and mortality to technological progress in the 
following sense: the basic assumption is that parents care about (derive utility from) 
the number of their children who survive to adulthood and their quality, usually 
defined in terms of human capital as measured by potential income. As mortality rates 
decline, it becomes increasingly worthwhile for parents to invest in each child’s 
human capital and to have fewer children. This linkage among mortality, fertility, and 
human-capital accumulation may be classified as a version of the well known 
quantity–quality tradeoff in fertility decisions, formulated back in the 1960s, and 
implemented widely since than, (see for example by Ben Porath, 1976; Barro and 
Becker, 1989; Becker, Murphy, and Tamura, 1990; Galor and Weil, 1996, 2000). In 
early models in this literature, the reduction of mortality rates at birth was assumed to 
be exogenous to the parents; in later models it became endogenous, inducing an 
inertial growth dynamic. When infant mortality is endogenous, the mortality rate of 
infants and children decreases as parents’ income increases, in a way that may be 
interpreted as an income effect on nutrition or the supply of public healthcare 
services. (See, for example, Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil, 2000; and Azarnert, 
2005.)  
According to the historical survey presented in Section 1, the focus on child 
mortality seems to have been relevant until the middle of twentieth century. By then, 
infant mortality probabilities had already declined to very low levels. Also as 
mentioned above, during the last fifty to sixty years, the prolongation of life 
expectancy in industrialized countries involved the adoption of new medical 
technologies that were used mainly (in terms of expenditure) to prevent and cure 
morbidity in adults. During these decades, however, fertility rates have continued to 
fall—below replacement level—and technological progress has continued.  
•    •  9    2.2  Models of Adult Longevity and Growth 
Exogenous Adult Longevity 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in understanding the effects of 
changes in adult health and life expectancy on the dynamics of growth, capital 
accumulation (physical and human), and fertility choices. Ehrlich and Lui (1991) may 
have been the first to investigate the relationship among adult longevity, fertility, and 
growth. Assuming that children support their parents at old age, they analyze the 
choice of the quality-quantity tradeoff and optimal investment in children's human 
capital in view of exogenous changes in infant mortality and parent longevity.  
Other works that investigate adult longevity came along more recently. Soares 
(2005), for example, investigates the effect of a decline in child and adult mortality on 
fertility, human capital accumulation and growth when parent are altruistic toward 
their children and derive direct utility from the extended longevity of their offspring. 
Soares finds that investment in both child and parent human capital increases in 
tandem with longevity while the fertility rate decreases.  
Capriani and Blackburn (2002) model the negative effects of adults’ longevity on 
fertility (without considering children’s quality) and its positive effect on adults’ 
investment in their own human capital as the working horizon is extended. In this 
study, the mortality of adults is determined by their parents’ education. In 
Chakraborty (2004) the decline in adult mortality promotes growth by promoting 
adults’ savings and investment in education (with no reference to fertility-
demography issues). In this study, mortality is a function of investment in health 
capital financed by a fixed public health tax on income.
2  
In both of the last-mentioned studies, an increase in longevity raises the expected 
return on investment in young adulthood in terms of a longer working life—i.e., a 
longer stream of return (income)—and the dynamic analysis in both studies focuses 
on the possibilities of becoming locked in poverty traps characterized by short life 
expectancy and low investment in human capital (i.e., they focus on early stages of 
technological and economic development).  
                                                           
2 Although the tax rate is fixed throughout the dynamic analysis, the  possibility of 
optimizing it by the social planner is considered in a footnote. Basic modeling of longevity as 
a function of a public health tax on income also appears in Blackburn and Capriani (2002).  
•    •  10Endogenous Adult Longevity 
Two recent unpublished papers model endogenous longevity in a manner that 
resembles the way it done in our study. According to Finlay (2005), the increase in 
life expectancy is endogenous to the agent who invests resources (part of income) in 
an implicit health-enhancing activity and self-protection, which increase the 
probability of surviving to the second period of working life. The study focuses on the 
effects of the donation of healthcare services to a poor country on the probability of 
escaping poverty traps. Finlay finds that investment in healthcare services is a 
necessary condition for investment in education but that donated healthcare services 
may crowd out private local investments in healthcare wherever donated education 
services stimulate private local investment in both education and healthcare.  
Bhattacharya and Qiao (2005) study the optimal mix of private and public 
financing of healthcare, with the public and private investments as complementary 
inputs in the survival function. They show that, according to some parameters, a 
public health tax enhances social welfare even though it may expose the economy to 
chaotic fluctuations. This study does not take investment in human capital into 
account. The investment in healthcare increases longevity, savings, and consumption 
after retirement.  
None of these works contains a fertility choice or an explicit modeling of the 
healthcare production sector. Thus, the investment in healthcare is modeled as a 
forgone consumption good (i.e., the relative price of consumption and health services 
is equal one). 
All the models we discussed so far, except Soares (2005), use the overlapping 
generations (OLG) frames work. Another exceptional study by Van Zon and Muysken 
(2001) uses the framework of Lucas’ (1988) infinite horizon growth model with 
constant fertility, to investigate economic growth in the presence of health technology 
that extends longevity and increases the productivity of human capital. Focusing on a 
steady-state analysis, they conclude that the preference of healthcare may result in 
slow growth rates associated with an aging population and high per-capita product.
3
                                                           
3 The defense economics literature follows a related line of research that studies the macroeconomic 
effects (growth, savings etc.) of changes in mortality rates due to terror or war activity. (See, for 
example, Eckstein and Tsiddon 2004, and Nir, 2004, who use the OLG framework as we do in the 
present work. However, there are at list two main distinctions between health and violence mortality 
and mortality prevention: 1) while health mortality increases with age, violence mortality seems to be 
neutral to age; 2) defense services are naturally public goods while health services are utilized at the 
private level. 
•    •  11  
2.3  Medical Technology Progress and Health Expenditure 
 
Several papers focus on the link between medical technology progress and healthcare 
expenditure. Jones (2002) stresses the role of medical technology progress in 
determining the share of healthcare expenditure in OECD countries, focusing on the 
large expenditure that occurs during the last years of life due to the use of the most 
expensive technologies to treat severe (deadly) illnesses. In this study, medical 
technology that advances at an exogenous rate makes it possible to cure more severe 
diseases and prolong life expectancy. Technological progress affects costs in two 
opposite directions: cutting-edge technologies are more costly while the old ones 
become cheaper in absolute terms. In this work income grows at an exogenous rate as 
well. 
Healthcare expenditure, which is most intensive among the elderly, is financed 
both by private savings and by transfers from the young in a complementary Pay As 
You Go paradigm. The extent of the transfers is determined in view of an exogenous 
social willingness to support the old. Social preferences regarding the amount of 
intergenerational support establish the limits of the increasing share of national health 
expenditure in product.  
Simulations of the model yield a good fit to twentieth-century data (in the U.S.) 
and, assuming that current transfers have reached the limit of society’s willingness to 
pay, the projection is for a mild decrease in the share of healthcare expenditure due to 
the decrease in the price of healthcare services. 
In a subsequent study, however, Jones and Hall (2004) claim that medical 
technology progress per se is not the main source of the increase in healthcare 
expenditure. Instead, it is a kind of income effect: as general technology progresses, 
income increases and the marginal utility of consumption decreases. Thus, extending 
the horizon of consumption (achieving greater longevity) makes it possible to put the 
growing income to greater use. Jones and Hall characterize the optimal share of 
healthcare expenditure as the ratio of utility elasticity to healthcare-production 
elasticity. Their analysis is based on the assumption that the elasticity of utility with 
respect to consumption decreases faster than the elasticity of healthcare (longevity) 
production with respect to healthcare-service utilization. They use a calibrated 
•    •  12simulation to demonstrate that under plausible assumptions about the utility 
function—its elasticity with respect to consumption—one may obtain a monotonic 
increase in optimal expenditure on healthcare up to 30% of income (until the middle 
of the century). The model is multi-periodic and multigenerational, and the decisions 
about healthcare expenditure are made by a social planner. As in the previously 
mentioned study, the growth rates of income and technology are exogenously 
assumed. Both studies assume fixed fertility rates.  
 
3.   The Present Study 
The present study models endogenous dynamics of growth, two-tailed population 
aging and advancing medical technology. We introduce into the conventional 
fertility–growth framework the choice of extending adult life expectancy. To analyze 
the aging process of wealthier industrialized economies in which the elderly are 
retired, we focus on medical technology progress that prolongs the lives of the elderly 
after retirement.  
By explicitly modeling the healthcare-services production sector and its 
endogenous technological progress, we may analyze the evolution of healthcare 
expenditures and some aspects of health taxation within a general equilibrium 
framework. In contrast to the models of Van Zon and Muysken (2001), Jones (2002), 
Jones and Hall (2004), and Soares (2005), ours is not a multi-periodic model but a 
two-period overlapping generations model. Thus, instead of extending longevity by 
additional periods, we increase life expectancy in terms of the probability of surviving 
into the second period of life (as in Finlay, 2005, and Cachunbary, 2004, for 
example). This bounds the ability to prolong life to two full periods (i.e., certainty of 
survival into the second period).  
This structural feature of the model, in our opinion, embodies the limited ability 
of advancing medical technology to extend life expectancy due to the biological aging 
process. Biological aging is a genetic process of sorts, in which most vital functions 
deteriorate continuously (from around the age of thirty), making the aging body more 
vulnerable to all kinds of illnesses and malfunctioning that eventually result in death 
(Bengston and Warner, 1999). Thus, the older people are, the more caregiving and 
curative treatment they need to achieve a marginal prolongation of life. The biological 
•    •  13lifespan of the human being—commonly perceived as constant—is not likely to be 
affected by health technology. The documented limit of longevity is about 120 years, 
irrespective of the progress in medical technology during the twentieth century.
4 From 
this perspective, health technology progress enables people to utilize more out of the 
biological lifespan but at decreasing marginal returns. By subjecting the productivity 
of health technology to the bounds of biological aging, we take an approach that is 
somewhat contrary to that of Jones and Hall (2004).
5 Therefore, we obtain contrary 
results, showing that optimal healthcare expenditure eventually decreases as 
technological progress advances. 
The model can be used as a comprehensive framework for the analysis of health 
tax policies in the context of economic growth and demographic dynamics. Some 
preliminary results regarding aspects of health taxation are presented.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the formal 
model; Section 3 constructs the static optimization conditions; Section 4 introduces 
the dynamic equilibrium of the model with some health taxation implications; Section 




4. The  Model 
 
In an overlapping generations economy with a homogeneous population, agents 
consume, reproduce (bear children), and rear their children. Adults work in the 
production of consumption good and healthcare services, and they generate human 
capital—their own and that of their children. 
  
                                                           
4 Galor and Moav (2002) claim that the urbanization process was associated with an increase in the 
biological lifespan as it become preferable, from an evolutionary point of view, to switch from a 
quantity strategy of reproduction to a quality strategy of reproduction.  
5 As in their explanation and projection of the observed increase in healthcare expenditure, they assume 
that the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption decreases faster than the elasticity of longevity 
with respect to healthcare-service utilization. 
•    •  14   4.1  Agents 
The agents may live for two periods: they live the first period with certainty and they 
survive into the second period probabilistically. The probability of survival depends 
on the use of healthcare services.  
Agents enter their first (active) period of life with initial basic human capital that 
their parents created while raising them. During their first period of life, agents 
allocate their time among (a)  investment in education (occupational training), 
(b) bearing and rearing their offspring, and (c) working.  
Education raises adult's human capital and thus the productivity of working time. 
The time devoted to rear each child positively affects child's basic human capital – 
child's quality. Working income is allocated between the consumption of healthcare 
services (at the end of the first period) and saving for consumption in the second 
period.
6 The amount of healthcare services utilization positively affects the 
probability of surviving into the second period of life (resembling life expectancy).  
The second period of life is devoted (probabilistically) to consumption. In the 
case of death, savings are forgone (i.e., not returned by the lenders). Assuming 
consumption in two periods or a perfect annuities market should not affect the 
qualitative results.  
The agents’ preferences over consumption and the quantity and quality of 
children are represented by the following separable expected utility function:  
 
1)  () {} ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 , , < ′ ′ > ′ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ = u u h n u c u z h n c U E π ρ   
The variables are defined as follows:  
ρ —time discount factor 
() z π —survival probability as a function of healthcare-service utilization—z   
c—consumption 
n—number of children 
h —the human capital of each child.   
 
                                                           
6This kind of timing greatly simplifies the dynamic analysis of the model by avoiding intergenerational 
trade in the market for healthcare services. Obviously it is unrealistic, since most healthcare 
expenditure accrues late in life. However, this is the only way the current literature analyzes healthcare-
service utilization. In the last section of this paper, we analyze a case of intergenerational exchange in 
the market for healthcare services.  
•    •  15   4.2  Production 
 Household Production and Labor Supply  
Workers are given one unit of time in their working (first) period of life. They allocate 
the time between educational attainment, denoted by  , and raising their children.   e
Giving birth to each child incurs fixed time cost F ; raising each child incurs a 
variable cost of  , to be chosen by the parent. The fixed cost of bearing a child 
reflects the finite nature of the number of births that a parent can give during the 
fertile period of her life.  
v
Thus, the time that a worker who has n children can devote to labor activity is 
( v F n e + ⋅ − − 1 )
7. The effective labor supply of a worker is the product of the time 
devoted to work and his/her human capital, which is denoted by g. Thus, a worker’s 
supply of labor time is:  
 
2)  () () v F n e g l + ⋅ − − ⋅ = 1  
 
The worker’s total human capital   is a function of her basic human capital - 
acquired from her parent as a child - denoted by  , and her chosen educational 





3)    () ( 1 0 , ≤ < ⋅ = λ
λ e h e h g )
 
The production of each child’s basic human capital consumes quantity v of 
parent time and complementary parent education, subject to the standard Cobb-
Douglas form: 
 
4)  () ( ) 1 0 , 1
1
1 1 1 < < ⋅ = −
−
− − − γ
γ γ
t t t t t v e e v h  
 
The foregoing production function of basic human capital is uncommon in the 
literature of fertility choice. It reflects the internalization of the conventional positive 
externality of parent education on the productivity of offspring.  
                                                           
7 For the sake of convenient we omit the time index wherever it is unnecessary.  
•    •  16 
Market Production  
Consumption product, denoted by  , and healthcare services, denoted by  , are 
produced in a two-sector economy. Each sector uses labor and capital as factor inputs 
with neoclassic production technology that implies constant returns to scale. Both 
sectors are perfectly competitive. Labor input is measured in terms of effective labor 
units, which are the product of labor (time) supply and workers’ human capital.  
c z
Each sector has a different productivity factor, determined by the average level of 
education in the economy. Thus, the productivity factors vary according to the 
evolution of the educational level in the economy. When the educational level rises, 
technological progress takes place (as in the conventional literature on modern 
growth).  
We specify the production function of each sector in the Cobb-Douglas form: 
 
5a)  ()
α α − ⋅ ⋅ =
1
c c K L e a C  
5b) , ()
β β − ⋅ ⋅ =
1
z z K L e b Z     
where:  
—aggregate effective unit of labor input   L
K —capital  
() e a , () e b —productivity factors, which are functions of the average level of 
education in the economy—e . 
We assume that technological progress is faster in the health sector than in the 
consumption sector. Thus, if education follows a rising path, the relative price of 
healthcare services will decline. We model the decline in the relative prices of 
healthcare services in order to capture the observed fact that the development, 
discovery, and adoption of new healthcare technologies allows consumers to purchase 
services that were previously unavailable at any price. Thus, the price of life 
prolongation in terms of all other resources in such a process declines.
8  
We also assume that healthcare services are not tradable internationally. This 
assumption relies on the perception that healthcare is based on labor-intensive 
services. After all, there is no substitute for the skilled labor of doctors and nurses in 
making an accurate diagnosis, performing surgeries (and other medical procedures 
                                                           
8 The same approach is applied by Jones and Hall (2004).  
•    •  17using advanced technology), and writing correct prescriptions. This assumption is 
supported by the composition of healthcare expenditure. Indeed, the cost of drugs 
(and other tradable healthcare goods) is not the main component of healthcare 
expenditure despite the great technological development that has occurred in the 
pharmaceutical industry.
9 Most healthcare expenditure is devoted to payment for 
labor inputs. 
By also assuming that the economy is small and open (with a fixed interest rate), 
we obtain the relative price of healthcare services and income -  , as a function of 
the average level of education.
w
10 Income is defined by: 
   










 determined by the parameters of the production functions and the 
interest rate. To focus on the technological progress that has occurred in the 
healthcare sector, we assume that consumption sector has constant technology, thus: 








The relative price of healthcare services in terms of consumption goods is: 
  
7)  () t t e p p =  
 
For later simulations, we specify the following price function:   
 
7a)   () () 0 5 . 0 > =
⋅ m e p
t e m
t t  
 
This price function was chosen in order to satisfy the condition of a price that 
decreases with the level of education, at a decreasing rate— ( ) () 0 , 0 > ′ ′ < ′ e p e p . The 
parameter   resembles the sensitivity of healthcare-technology progress to the level 
of education. One may think of an increase in   as an improvement in healthcare-
production technology that is exogenous to the level of education—akin to the 
“unexpected” discovery of new major treatment in view of a fixed level of education. 
Figure 1 shows the price function (for 
m
m
) 15 = m  with the level of education on the 
horizontal axis and the price of healthcare services on the vertical axis.  
                                                           
9 Only 10% of total health expenditure in the U.S in 2000 went for drugs (Cerda, 2004). 
10 See the full elaboration in appendix 1. 
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The production of health itself—measured in life expectancy—is subject to 
survival function  ( ) [ 1 , ] µ π ∈ z , which increases with the utilization of healthcare 
services but with a declining marginal return: 
(8)  ,  () 1 0 : 0 ; 0 < < = = µ µ π where z for t
   ,  ()1 ; 0 < < > t t z z for π µ
  .  () () ()1 : lim 0 0 : = < ′ ′ > ′
∞ → t z t t z z z and π π π
The parameter µ  is the base survival probability that the agent has if s/he uses no 
healthcare services at all. Changes in the base survival probability may account for 
changes in life expectancy that are exogenous to the use of healthcare services, e.g., 
improvements in lifestyle, environmental conditions, or any other health-related 
parameters that are cost-free.  
The assumed form of the survival function is common for the modeling of life 
expectancy within an OLG framework.
11 Bear in mind that this way of modeling life 
expectancy bounds the maximum longevity. We interpret the bound as biological due 
to genetic nature of the aging process. According to this interpretation, the use of 
healthcare services helps to prevent death due to illnesses within the biological 
lifespan but becomes more and more costly as the aging process progresses.  
Later in this study we will use the following particular specification: 
 
                                                           
11 See, for example, Cachunbary (2004) and Finlay (2005). 
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5.  Agent Optimization 
 
Putting together all the characters of the economy we have defined, the representative 
agent should solve the following constrained optimization: 
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Using the aforementioned constraints, we may reformulate the maximization problem 
in terms of the following indirect utility function: 
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Differentiating for the four chosen variables, we obtain the following first-order 
conditions:  
 
1.  Differentiating for e, we obtain: 
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Optimum level of education eshould equalize the marginal effect of education on 
the utility of consumption occasioned by increasing income to its effect on the 
marginal utility of children due to the positive effect on children’s human capital.   
 
2.  Differentiating for  , we get:  n
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•    •  20The optimum number of children equalizes the marginal increase in utility from 
the marginal child to the marginal loss of utility from consumption due to the time 
devoted to each child, which has an opportunity cost in working time, i.e., income.  
 
Dividing Condition 1 by Condition 2, we get:  
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Proposition 1: The number of children is a decreasing function of parent's 
educational attainment, fixed cost of giving birth, total time invested in each 
child, and the productivity of time investment in the formation of basic human 
capital.  
  
The outcome of Proposition 1 resembles the competitive uses of time over the fertile 
and productive years of adult life, expressed in the tradeoff that a parent faces 
between increasing her own income (i.e., consumption) and having more children. It 
also resembles the quality–quantity tradeoff, as an increase in parents’ education, time 
invested in each child and its productivity has a positive effect on child's quality. The 
next proposition will define the exact form of this tradeoff.  














e  and  1 < +γ λ . 
Computing the agent’s income after plugging in the optimal number of children, we 
obtain:  
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e  and  1 > +γ λ . 
 
3. Differentiating  for  v, we get:  
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•    •  21Optimizing the time invested in each child equalizes the marginal utility of the 
increase in the child’s human capital to the marginal loss of utility due to forgone 
income and consumption.  
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Proposition 2 specifies the quality–quantity tradeoff that was introduced in 
proposition 1, as an 'indirect tradeoff' only:  the number of children declines with the 
parent’s education level, which, in turn, increases the productivity of the time 
investment in each child’s human capital (quality) while the time invested in each 
child is fixed. However as parent's education is higher the fixed time invested in each 
child bears higher opportunity cost in terms of foregone income. 
Two parameters affect positively the optimal amount of time invested. (a) The 
productivity of time in producing child’s human capital has a positive effect on the 
returns to investment and, thereby, on the optimal investment level as well. (b) The 
fixed cost of bearing a child makes the quantity costly relative to quality. Before 
moving on, we use the foregoing results to obtain utility  ( ) e n v u , ,  as a function of the 
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4. Differentiating  for  z , we obtain: 
 
17)  () () ( ) () ( ) c u z p r c u z ′ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + = ⋅ ′ π π 1  
                                                           
12 This result holds for other conventional specifications of human capital functional forms, such as:  
() ( ) ( ) 0 , , > ⋅ + = θ θ v e e v h ,  as long as   is canceled in the ratio:  e ( )
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This first-order condition requires agents to equalize the benefit from utilizing a 
marginal unit of healthcare service (on the left) to its opportunity cost (the expected 
marginal utility of consumption). Equation (17) may be translated into terms of 
elasticity:  
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where  z , π η  is the elasticity of life expectancy with respect to the utilization of 
healthcare services and  c u, ε  is the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption
13.  
Equation (17a) states that the optimal ratio of the shares of expenditure (on healthcare 
and consumption) is equal to the ratio of the elasticity of the survival function with 
respect to healthcare services and the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption. 

















To obtain an explicit function of the agent’s demand for healthcare services, we 
apply the survival function defined in Equation (8a):  
 










µ π ,      ( 1 0 < < µ  ) 
 






c u  and, for convenience, we set; 
2
1
= φ  so that the utility function is 
() c c u 2 = . The assumed utility function has constant elasticity with respect to the 
level of consumption,  2 , = c u ε .  
Figure 2 shows that the elasticity of the assumed survival function (vertical axis) 
increases (decreases) with low (high) level of healthcare utilization (horizontal axis). 
                                                           
13 Same result has derived by Hall and Jones (2004). 
•    •  23First, elasticity increases quickly with z and then decreases relatively slowly, verging 
on zero as z approaches infinity. 
 








The assumed functional forms clash with Hall and Jones’ (2004) assumption that 
the elasticity of the utility function decreases more quickly than the elasticity of 
healthcare production. This difference in assumptions is reflected in the different 
results that we obtain regarding the evolution of the share of healthcare expenditure: 
According to Equation (17a), and to the specific functional forms that we assume, the 
share of healthcare expenditures will rise at a low level of  z  and will fall at a high 
level of z . Plugging the assumed specific functions into Equation (17b), we obtain
14:  
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Using the identity  () ( ) r z p w c + ⋅ ⋅ − = 1 ,
15 we obtain: 
 

















Proposition 3: Demand for healthcare services and life expectancy are a non-
decreasing function of real income, expressed in terms of health.  
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15 See full elaboration in Appendix 2. 
•    •  24More specifically, as long as real income—in terms of healthcare services—is below 
a certain minimum level, demand for healthcare services will be zero (and life 
expectancy equals µ ). Above this level the demand for healthcare increases with 
income and decreases with healthcare price. The minimum income level rises with the 
base survival rate, as defined in the following inequality: 
 








Since healthcare services appear to be a normal good under the specified 
functional forms of the utility and survival function, the share of these services rises 
(falls) with income for low (high) levels of income. 
Putting propositions 1 and 3 together, we find that the educational process is 
linked to two-tailed aging as a consequence of adult agent optimization. Higher 
education is acquired in order to sustain higher income, which accommodates 
both a higher level of consumption and a longer horizon of consumption at old 
age. Education and the bearing and rearing of children are the competing uses of 
the productive and fertile age interval. Thus, the higher (expected) utility of 
consumption that is obtained by means of higher education is followed by a 
reduction in the time devoted to children, resulting in less utility of children due 
to lower fertility. The negative effect of lower fertility on the utility derived from 
children is partly compensated for by an increase in the quality of children due 
to the positive external effect of their parent’s education.  
 
6.  Dynamics of Growth and Aging Population: 
     6.1  Existence of Converging Dynamics 
 
Using the results obtained in the first-order optimization conditions, we rewrite agent 
utility as a function of a single-choice variable—the level of education, e. The 
optimal education level should maximize the following utility function: 
 
20)  {} () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( ) e h e n u e z e p e w r u e z U E Max
e
⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ = 1 : π ρ  
•    •  25Plugging the explicit functions  ( ) ( ) ( ) and e h e n e z , , , ( ) e w  into Equation (20) and 
differentiating for  , we obtain a single first-order condition that defines the solution 
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By using Equation (17)— ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) c u z p r c u z ′ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + = ⋅ ′ π π 1 —and setting ρ  to be 
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By assuming a rational expectations equilibrium in the economy, we impose that 
the average level of education in the economy—e —is equal to the optimal level of 
education chosen by the representative agent—e. Thus, each agent takes into account 
the expected decrease in the price of healthcare services if the level of education rises. 
This consideration is not explicit in Equation (21a) but is implicit in the computed 
optimal amount of z (and c) out of any possible (chosen) income.  
We express Equation (21a) as  0 = ⋅ + ξ ψ σ . Since σ  and ξ  are always positive, 
a necessary condition for an interior solution is  0 < ψ , which means:  
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For this condition to be met, the total labor income defined in Equation (12) must 
increase with education. However, it is already contained in the non-negative income 
constraint. By imposing the positive income and the number of children, we obtain 
lower and upper bounds for the optimal level of education, denoted respectively as   
and  . Thus, for 
l e
u e 1 > +γ λ we obtain: 
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Defining Equation (21a) as  ( ) 1 , − t t e e φ , we can use the implicit functions theorem 
to investigate the possible dynamics of the education level—the effect of   on  . 
As education approaches its lower bound ( ), the right-hand side of Equation 
(21a) and the entire expression in (21a) approach infinity (
1 − t e t e
l e e →
∞ → σ ). By the same 
token, as education approaches its upper bound ( ), the left-hand side of 
Equation (21a) and the entire expression in (21a) approach minus 
infinity(
u e e →
) −∞ → ⋅ξ ψ . Hence, if there is a unique interior solution for the optimization 
problem, it must be that the expression in Equation (21a) decreases as e approximates 
the optimal level of education— . In other words, assuming the existence of a 
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Differentiating  () 1 , − t t e e φ  for   we obtain:   1 − t e
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The first term is positive:  ( ) ( ) 0
1 > ′ ⋅ ′ ⋅ ′ ⋅ ′
− e e w c u z z
t π . Hence, a sufficient condition 











 is the following: 
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Under the assumed utility and income functions, Condition (22) may be rewritten 
as: 
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Since   has an upper bound— —the foregoing condition may be satisfied if 
the consumption level is high enough. The level that accomplishes this may be 
attained at a productivity factor—
1 − t e u e
A—that is large enough. If the condition 
























To demonstrate the existence of the increasing and converging path of the 
education level, we perform a simulation.
16 The results of the simulation, presented in 
Figure 3, illustrate the existence of an increasing and converging level of education 
that defines the optimal paths of all other variables. Life expectancy, consumption, 
and demand for healthcare services increase while fertility decreases. The simulation 




Figure 3  
 
The decrease in the share of healthcare expenditure deserves special attention 
because it contradicts the observed trend in real data. At lower values of the education 
                                                           
16 For the simulation, we use the price function - ( ) e p , specified in Equation 5a.  
17 The parameter values we use are:
l e e m A F r = = = = = = = = 0 , 11 , 11 , 05 . 0 , 8 . 0 , 1 , 05 . 0 , 6 . 0 γ λ µ . 
We use the same parameters in all further simulations. The qualitative results of this simulation are 
stable for a large range of values around this baseline set.    
•    •  28productivity parameters  A and  , demand for healthcare is zero and education 
sustains a low-level steady state. From some threshold of these parameters, the levels 
of demand for healthcare services and education jump to a high-level steady state. For 
the present set of parameterization, it happens where   and 
m
m A approximate the value 
of 10. In the neighborhood of this critical value, the utility function   does not have 
a single peak.
U
18 Around this threshold level of the parameter values, different paths of 
healthcare expenditure share are possible. For parameter values that are slightly above 
the threshold, the share of healthcare expenditure rises monotonically with education 
along the convergence path. At slightly higher values, the share of healthcare 
expenditure increases sharply and then decreases moderately, and for higher values 
the share of healthcare expenditure along the convergence path declines 
monotonically, as Figure 3 shows. The higher the base survival rate, the higher the 
threshold level of parameters  A and  .  m
The following figures illustrate the different converging paths of healthcare 
expenditure for parameter values that slightly exceed the critical values (while the 
convergence path of the other variables is qualitatively unchanged). For the 
parameters   in Figure 3a, the share of healthcare expenditure increases 
monotonically; for the parameters 
11 , 10 = = A m
11 , 5 . 10 = = A m  in Figure 3b, the share increases 




                                                           
18  Appendix 4 illustrates the non-concavity of  U. 
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Figure 3b 
 
As we recall (from Equation 17a), the optimal share of healthcare expenditure is 
(positively) correlated to the elasticity of the survival function with respect to z, which 
first increases and then decreases. For low (high) levels of education productivity 
(defined by A and  ), healthcare-service utilization ( ) is relatively low (high) for 
either income or substitution effects and lies within the increasing (decreasing) range 
of elasticity. Thus, the share of healthcare expenditure may rise or decline while the 
levels of education and healthcare-service utilization increase. This result derive from 
the assumption that the elasticity of healthcare production (at some point) decreases 
(faster than the elasticity of consumption utility).  
m z
If we reinforce the technological progress by allowing an occasional exogenous 
increase in the parameter  A and  , we can make sure that the optimal share of 
healthcare expenditure will eventually decrease. In view of the points that we have 
demonstrated, we may identify the trend of healthcare expenditure in the past fifty 
years as the first phase of development just after reaching the threshold level. Thus, 
we may expect future technological developments to cause the share of healthcare 
expenditure to decline. 
m
However, the effect of such a decrease in   on the optimal level of the education 
path is ambiguous. As we recall, agents derive utility from both consumption and 
children in accordance with the way they allocate their time, where the level of 
education reflects the substitution between the two (higher education being associated 
with higher consumption and fewer children). Thus, a decrease of   induces two 
m
m
•    •  30opposite effects. On the one hand, it makes education more productive in terms of life 
expectancy (and expected utility of consumption); this is a sort of substitution effect. 
On the other hand, the higher productivity of education has a positive income effect 
on both sources of utility—consumption and children.  
At low values of real income, the elasticity of healthcare production increases 
with the reduction of   and yields a strong improvement in education productivity, 
which means a strong substitution effect that dominates the income effect. 
Consequently, education rises and fertility falls. As the elasticity of healthcare 
production decreases (with higher values of real income) the substitution effect 
weakens and the income effect becomes dominant. Thus, the level of education falls 
and fertility rises even though life expectancy and consumption increase. An increase 
in   reduces the share of healthcare expenditure at every positive level of healthcare-
service utilization.  
m
m
For an increase in productivity parameter A, we found a monotonic positive 
effect on the optimal education level (i.e., the substitution effect is always dominant). 
Thus, one may expect future major developments in medical technology, which will 
significantly improve the benefits gained from health expenditure, to offset (at least 
partly) the current trend of declining fertility. Figures 4 and 5 present the simulated 
education levels at steady state (on the vertical axis) for different values of   and  m A 
(on the horizontal axis). The threshold levels of the parameters (around the value of 
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Figure 5 
 
An increase in both  Aand  m increases the steady state share of healthcare 
expenditure in a small neighborhood around their threshold levels, bur higher values 
of  Aand  m are associated with lower share of healthcare expenditure at the steady 
state
19. 
Finlay (2005) demonstrates a negative effect of donated healthcare aid to poor 
countries (which increases adult life expectancy) on the countries’ incentives to invest 
in education. We obtain a similar result by raising the base survival rate. The base 
survival rate has a negative effect on the marginal productivity of healthcare services, 
which inhibits investment in education.  However, it also has a positive effect on the 
(marginal) expected utility of consumption, which stimulates investment in 
education.
20 Figures 6 and 6a show that for the set of parameters that we use 
education and the share of healthcare expenditure at steady state decrease 
monotonically at the level of the base survival rate. If the base survival rate is high 
enough, education and the share of healthcare expenditure fall steeply to a low-level 
steady state. 
 
                                                           
19 See graphs in Appendix 3. 
20 It is a commonly found in exogenous mortality models that an increase in adults’ survival probability 
stimulates education investment. See, for example, Blackburn and Capriani (2002). 





7.  Expenditure on Healthcare  and (sub) Optimal Health-Tax. 
 
In many developed countries (e.g., Canada, U.K., Sweden, and Israel), the healthcare 
sector is largely public and financed by a flat-rate income tax. If the healthcare sector 
is purely public, the health-tax rate equals the share of healthcare expenditure in 
income.
21. In this case, the agent maximizes his utility in view of the following 
constraints:  
 
                                                           
21 In Chakraborty (2004) this kind of health tax serves is the sole source of finance for healthcare 
expenditure. 
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The first three optimization conditions that yield propositions 1 and 2 (regarding 
the optimal number of children and the optimal investment in each child) do not 
change and the fourth condition (regarding the optimal demand for healthcare 
services) is no longer relevant because income allocation between consumption and 
health is given by τ . Thus, we move to the following utility function in the level of 
education:  
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It is easy to verify that the optimal tax rate, chosen by a social planner to 
maximize the utility of agents in each generation, will coincide with the share of 
healthcare expenditure (in national income) that is optimally chosen by the agents in 
the decentralized economy.
22 Hence it is of interest to investigate the effects of 
various inefficient tax rates.  
Usually there is room for both public and private provision of healthcare services, 
although the private sector may be strongly regulated and severely restricted in size 
and in the types of activities allowed to it.
23 As long as an overall supply shortage 
exists, the effect of a suboptimal tax rate will be the same as it would be in the case of 
a purely public healthcare sector. To obtain over utilization of healthcare services, 
however, the compulsory public supply must be higher than optimal, resulting in zero 
demand for private healthcare services.   
                                                           
22 Differentiating Equation 22a for τ , we obtain  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) c u e p r c u z ′ ⋅ ⋅ + = ⋅ ⋅ 1 π ρ  
23 We assume that private and public services are perfect substitutes.  
•    •  34Assuming that total utility function  ( ) e U  has a single peak, the effects of (small) 
deviations from the optimal tax rate are as follows:  
 
Proposition 4: tax rates that are higher (lower) than the optimum will raise 
(lower) the level of education when η increases in  and have the opposite effect 
when 
e
η decreases in e. 
 
Recall that the optimal share of healthcare expenditure as a function of education 
level follows a bell curve and corresponds to the shape of the elasticity of the survival 
function. Concavity of 
24 () e U  is sufficient (although not necessary) to ensure that, 
under the restriction of a non-optimal tax rate, the corresponding restricted optimal 
level of education will be on the same side of the optimal healthcare-expenditure 
curve. In other words, the economy does not shift from the decreasing range of η to 
its increasing range (and vice versa). 
Thus, for economies on a rising path of healthcare expenditure, an excessive rate 
of health tax stimulates investment in education and accelerates the dynamic of 
growth. In economies that are on a downward path, in contrast, suboptimal taxation 
may accelerate the convergence to steady state. Figure 7 shows simulation results of 
the education level in steady state (vertical axis) at different levels of health tax 
(horizontal axis). Note that the optimal share of healthcare expenditure for the set of 





                                                           
24  I.e., the parameters are out of threshold level's neighborhood.  
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The proposed (non-monotonic) effect of sub optimal health-tax rate on 
educational attainment and growth may have interesting implications for income 
inequality, where a uniform (fixed) health tax is implemented in the presence of 
population heterogeneity with respect to initial income, human capital, etc. 
however this issue is beyond the scope of the present study.   
 
8.  Concluding Remarks 
 
 
We have developed a model of endogenous growth, progress in medical technology, 
and population aging, driven by human capital accumulation. The model allows us to 
simulate and analyze remarkable economic and demographic phenomena in recent 
decades. Specifically, it creates an analytical framework for the study of a two-tailed 
aging population and the growth process in view of advancing medical technology, 
with a variable share of healthcare expenditure in national income. 
The model is able to reproduces the dynamics that are observed as a result of the 
optimization problem regarding the number and quality of children, life expectancy, 
and consumption level, reduced to a single-choice variable: the level of education. By 
using specific functional forms, we could derive explicit demand for healthcare 
services and demonstrate the evolution and convergence of the optimal path of 
education, fertility, life expectancy, and healthcare expenditure. 
We showed that the assumption of an upper bound for the ability of medical 
technology to prolong life results in a potential decrease in the share of healthcare. 
We also showed that a further improvement in the state of healthcare, or a reduction 
in the price of healthcare services that are exogenous to the level of education, may 
offset the trends of declining fertility and increasing investment in human capital. To 
gauge the preliminary implications of the model as an analytical tool for health-tax 
policy, we explored the effects of non-optimal health-tax rates on rates and levels of 
growth in steady state. 
 
•    •  369.  Future Research 
 
The future study will focus on the healthcare finance system implications of the 
model developed in this paper, while expanding the present frame towards a more 
realistic structure. Two possible extensions we will try to tackle are: (1) the inclusion 
of intergenerational exchange (IGE), and (2) Releasing the assumption of perfect 
competitive healthcare sector. In the macroeconomic literature, the healthcare system-
policy is commonly perceived as an extension of the social security policy – system, 
which is extensively analyzed. Hence the next stage of the present work will attempt 
to perform this extension – filling the gap of analyzing the healthcare system – policy 
and structure in the macroeconomic framework 
 
9.1 Intergenerational exchange (IGE) 
 
In the real world, elderly people buy goods—particularly, healthcare services—
from young people. Thus, it seems very natural to expand the analysis of the basic 
model to include this intergenerational exchange. Yet I am not aware of any such 
analysis within a full comprehensive dynamic framework. Thus the future study will 
address the effects of IGE on the dynamics investigated in the present study.   
Most of developed countries run governmental pay as you go (PAYG) Social 
security (SS) systems
25. In a Pay As You Go (PAYG) system compulsory savings 
(contributions) of the young generation in each period finance the payments (benefits) 
of the elderly. PAYG contributions are commonly collected by means of a payroll 
(income) tax. In an aging society there is a growing burden on the young generation 
which may make threat the sustainability of the PAYG system. This is the reason for 
the large concern in pension reforms (especially in the U.S, where they baby boomers 
are getting close to retirement age). The alternative of the PAYG finance system id 
the fully funded (FF) system in which the savings of each generation (currently 
invested in the capital markets) finance its own consumption at elderly.  
The same systems may use to finance healthcare expenditures. In most countries 
health care services for the elderly are at least partially financed by taxing the young – 
countries with public health sectors run PAYG systems, and in others (like the U.S) 
                                                           
25 The following review on social security literature is based on the comprehensive survey of  Sala I 
Martin and Mulligan (1999b, 1999c).  
•    •  37health expenditures of elderly are budgetary financed (e.g. the Medicare program in 
the U.S).    
There are several positive theories aimed to explain the common use of the 
PAYG systems in developed countries. Political economy explanations view the 
intergenerational transfers as a result of political equilibrium. Efficiency theories 
perceive the governmental SS system as a mechanism which is designed to overcome 
market failures, such as (1) enabling the risk sharing of uncertain income at elderly in 
the presence of asymmetric information, (2) encouraging old workers who have 
negative externalities on the labor productivity to retire, (3) helping to overcome 
myopic preferences.         
Basically these theories may be applied to healthcare finance systems as well, but 
in the presence of both savings system and the changing relative price of the two good 
– which may induce specific uncertainty - it seems required to investigate the 
interplay between the two possible saving systems in the frame work of our present 
study.   
Another 'efficiency' explanation of PAYG systems is based on external (un-
internalized) effects of current generation decisions on future generations. A common 
example is the decisions regard investment in next generation (children) human 
capital. In this case the PAYG system serve as a mechanism to pay the return on the 
investment in the next generations encouraging the adults (parents) internalizing the 
effect of their investment on the next generation (children) income.  
 Thinking about healthcare services we might find special externalities on the 
opposite direction as well. As new healthcare services for the elderly are developed it 
may be in the interest of the young generations to support-finance the utilization of 
these technologies by the elderly, otherwise these technologies might not be available 
in the market in the next generation or they would be not developed at first place in 
the lack of sufficient potential demand. Let us call this hypothesis – "backward IGE 
effect".  
 
However this kind of reasoning can not be modeled under the assumption of 
perfect competitive health production sector that we use un the resent study. Thus we 
turn to discuss possible alternative modeling of the healthcare production sector. 
 
9.2 Imperfect competition in the healthcare sector 
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Obviously the assumption of perfect competitive healthcare sector is not realistic, 
especially when dealing with technological progress which involves significant 
Research and development (R&D) activity and costs, and patent (monopolistic) right. 
Thus it would be natural to replace the perfect competitive assumption, with 
monopolistic competition which includes explicit R&D decisions, for example. In 
such a framework we of investigate the effects of patent policy issues on the dynamics 
we explored in the present study. In addition, such a frame work may enable us to 
model the "backward IGE effect" as the willingness of the young generation to share 
the finance of the fix R&D costs (in healthcare sector) with the old. 
Another possible way to model the Backward IGE effect is to assume a kind of 
Learning By Doing process in the healthcare sector, which means that the technology 
progress will be driven by both current generation education and former generation 
demand – utilization.  
 
Appendix 1: Price and wage equations  
 
Using equations (5a) and (5b) and assuming a small open economy, we obtain the 
following labor-to-capital ratio for each sector: 
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where   is capital per worker in the sector,  i k ( ) z c i , = , and the marginal productivity 
in the health sector is expressed in terms of a consumption good (i.e., multiplied by 
relative price  ). Since both sectors share the same interest rate, we obtain:   p
 






















•    •  39Wages in each sector are equal to the marginal productivity of the respective 
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Equalizing the two price equations, we find that capital per worker in the 
healthcare sector is a constant proportion of the capital-per-worker ratio in the 












































Using the first interest rate— —condition to express  c MPk
c k
l  in terms of the 
parameters of the model and the interest rate, we obtain: 
 
































•    •  40Plugging the above term of 
c k
l  into the last price equation, we obtain: 
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By plugging the same term for 
c k
l  into the first wage equation, we may define 
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•    •  41Appendix 2: Elaborating the demand for healthcare services-    z
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which may be written explicitly as: 
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Elaborating the right side, we obtain: 
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•    •  42Appendix 3: Optimal share of health services at steady state for different 
parameter values 
 
The following graphs present the share of healthcare expenditure at steady state for 
different levels of the parameters  A and  . Note that when  decreases the share of 
healthcare expenditure verges on zero, but when 
m m
A decreases the share of healthcare 








•    •  43Appendix 4: Threshold Effect and Non-Concavity of U  
The graphs below show the jump in the optimal level of education around the critical 
values of  A and m—the threshold effect—and the non-concavity of U at this range. 
On the horizontal axis is the level of education and on the vertical axis is the utility 
level, with the level of education imposed to be equal for parents and children (steady 
state).  
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